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“The Western Powers have calmly resolved,” Kennedy said at the United Nations a few days later, “to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin.” The following week, Secretary of Defense McNamara told the press that the United States would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons “whenever we feel it necessary to protect our vital interests.” And he confidently added that America’s nuclear stockpile was much larger than that of the Soviet Union. The administration now found it useful to deflate the myth of the missile gap. Details about SAC’s ability to destroy the Soviet Union were provided to NATO officials — so that Soviet intelligence officers who’d infiltrated NATO would share the information with the Kremlin. Perceptions of American military strength were important, as tensions rose in Europe. Soviet fighter planes buzzed commercial airliners heading to West Berlin and dropped chaff to disrupt their navigational systems. Border guards in East Berlin shot at civilians trying to get past the wall. Police officers in West Berlin responded by firing clouds of tear gas to help the refugees escape — and fought a gun battle with East German police.

Although negotiations with the Soviets quietly continued, on October 10, President Kennedy, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the head of the Joint Chiefs, and a few other advisers met at the White House to finalize plans for a military defense of West Berlin. Everyone agreed about the first three phases, a gradually escalating set of responses with conventional weapons. But a disagreement arose over Phase IV, the point at which nuclear weapons would be introduced. McNamara said that tactical weapons should be used first, to protect NATO troops and show the Soviets that America wasn’t afraid to fight a nuclear war. Paul H. Nitze — a McNamara aide and an advocate not only of containing, but of overthrowing, Communist regimes throughout the world — thought the use of tactical weapons would be a mistake. According to notes of the meeting, Nitze said that Phase IV should begin with the United States launching an all-out first strike against the Soviet Union, because “with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious.” Neither side could be confident of winning a nuclear exchange, McNamara argued — and the consequences would be devastating for both. The meeting ended with the issue unresolved.

When President Kennedy later sent instructions for the defense of West Berlin to General Norstad, Phase IV was made up of three parts:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons….

C. General nuclear war.

Although Norstad was supposed to try A and B before proceeding to C, the behavior of the Soviets could prompt the United States to begin with C.

Norstad had already received these orders on October 27, when Soviet and American tanks confronted one another at Checkpoint Charlie, the last border crossing in Berlin. An American diplomat had been detained by East German border guards the previous week, and a dispute arose over the process of gaining access to East Berlin. American tanks were sent to Checkpoint Charlie as a show of strength. Soviet tanks appeared there at about five in the evening on the twenty-seventh. The British soon deployed two antitank guns to support the Americans, while all the French troops in West Berlin remained safely in their barracks. For the first time since the Cold War began, tanks belonging to the U.S. Army and the Red Army pointed their guns at one another, separated by about a hundred yards. General Norstad had ordered his tank commanders to tear down the Berlin Wall, if East German guards blocked the rightful passage of American civilians. Amid the armored standoff at the border, Secretary of State Rusk had those orders rescinded. A miscalculation by either side, a needless provocation, could lead to war.

The Soviet foreign minister met with the American ambassador in Moscow to discuss the situation. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the president’s younger brother, had a secret, late-night meeting with Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet intelligence officer, in Washington, D.C. The negotiations were successful. Sixteen hours after arriving at the border, the Soviet tanks turned around and left. The American tanks departed half an hour later.

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