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The latest intelligence reports on the Soviet Union added a new twist to the debate over America’s nuclear strategy. Within weeks of taking office, President Kennedy found out that the missile gap did not exist. Like the bomber gap, it was a myth. For years it had been sustained by faulty assumptions, Soviet deception, and a willingness at the Department of Defense to believe the worst-case scenario — especially when it justified more spending on defense. The CIA had estimated that the Soviet Union might have five hundred long-range ballistic missiles by the middle of 1961. Air Force Intelligence had warned that the Soviets might soon have twice that number. But aerial photographs of the Soviet Union, taken by U-2 spy planes and the new Discoverer spy satellite, now suggested that those estimates were wrong. The photos confirmed the existence of only four missiles that could reach the United States.

Instead of deploying long-range missiles to attack the United States, the Soviets had built hundreds of medium-and intermediate-range missiles to destroy the major cities of Western Europe. The strategy had been dictated, in large part, by necessity. Khrushchev’s boasts — that his factories were turning out 250 long-range missiles a year, that the Soviet Union had more missiles than it would ever need — were all a bluff. For years the Soviet missile program had been plagued with engineering and design problems. Medium-range missiles were less technologically demanding. It wasn’t easy to build a weapon that could fly six thousand miles and put a warhead near its target. And on October 24, 1960, the Soviet program had secretly endured a major setback.

Like the Atlas, the first Soviet long-range missiles used liquid oxygen as a propellant, and they required a lengthy fueling process before launch. A new Soviet missile, the R-16, used hypergolic propellants stored separately within its airframe, like the Titan II. The R-16 would be able to lift off within minutes. It was the largest missile that had ever been built, and Khrushchev was eager for its inaugural flight to take place before November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Marshal Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin, head of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, traveled to Kazakhstan and supervised preparations for the launch of an R-16 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome.

As the giant missile sat on the launchpad, full of oxidizer and fuel, a series of malfunctions occurred. Angry about the delay, under tremendous pressure from the Kremlin, and eager to know what was wrong, Nedelin drove to the pad. Half an hour before the scheduled launch, a crew of technicians was working on the missile when its second-stage engine started without warning. Flames from the engine shot downward and ignited the fuel tank of the first stage. Marshal Nedelin was sitting in a chair about fifty feet from the missile when it exploded. He was killed, along with many of the Soviet Union’s top rocket scientists and about one hundred other people. The chief designer of the R-16, Mikhail Yangel, happened to be taking a cigarette break in an underground bunker and survived the explosion. Movie cameras set up to record the launch instead captured some horrific images — men running for their lives, as an immense fireball pursues and then engulfs them; men falling to the ground, their clothes on fire; everywhere, clouds of deadly smoke with a reddish glow. The following day, TASS, the official Soviet news agency, announced that Nedelin had been killed in a plane crash.

Far from being grounds for celebration, the absence of a missile gap became a potential source of embarrassment for the Kennedy administration. Many of the claims made by the Democrats during the recent presidential campaign now seemed baseless. Although General Power still insisted that the Soviets were hiding their long-range missiles beneath camouflage, the United States clearly had not fallen behind in the nuclear arms race. Public knowledge of that fact would be inconvenient — and so the public wasn’t told. When McNamara admitted that the missile gap was a myth, during an off-the-record briefing with reporters, President Kennedy was displeased.