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For Secretary of Defense McNamara, the locks were part of a larger effort to regain not only American control but also civilian control of nuclear weapons. He felt adamant that the president of the United States should have the sole authority to order a weapon’s use. The military had gained far too much power over the nuclear arsenal since the days of Harry Truman, McNamara thought — and the lack of civilian oversight at NATO was chilling. The Davy Crockett recoilless rifle was especially problematic. Its atomic projectiles weighed about fifty pounds and would be easy to steal. They were small enough to fit in a duffle bag or a backpack. After reading the joint committee’s report, President Kennedy halted the dispersal of nuclear weapons among America’s NATO allies. Studies on weapon safety and command and control were commissioned. At Sandia, the development of coded, electromechanical locks was begun on a crash basis. Known at first as “Prescribed Action Links,” the locks were given a new name, one that sounded less restrictive, in the hopes of appeasing the military. “Permissive Action Links” sounded more friendly, as did the acronym: PALs.

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Within seven weeks of President Kennedy’s inauguration, the broad outlines of his defense policies were set. Spending on conventional forces would increase. More Polaris submarines would be built. And intercontinental ballistic missiles would largely replace bombers. Missiles were thought to be faster, cheaper, and less likely to be destroyed in a surprise attack. The Atlases, Titans, Jupiters, and Thors, so recently rushed into service, would be decommissioned as soon as possible. Less expensive, solid-fueled missiles would replace them. McNamara and his team had come to believe that nuclear weapons with a lower yield were more cost effective. The Minuteman missile carried a 1-megaton warhead, and calculations suggested that five of them would inflict more damage than a single 9-megaton warhead carried by a Titan II. Nevertheless, a relatively small number of Titan II missiles would be retained, for the time being. They would be useful for destroying naval bases, missile complexes, and underground command centers.

The Polaris submarine seemed like the ideal weapon system for the Kennedy administration’s strategic goals. The sixteen missiles on each sub would serve as a powerful deterrent to the Soviets, greatly increasing the odds that the United States could offer some sort of nuclear response after a surprise attack. Safely hidden beneath the ocean, the submarines could also give the president more time to think or negotiate during a crisis. In 1958 the Navy had requested a dozen Polaris subs; facing intense pressure from Congress, Eisenhower later agreed to deploy 19. Kennedy decided to build 41. The 656 missiles of the Polaris fleet would be aimed solely at “countervalue” targets — at civilians who lived in the major cities of the Soviet Union.

The Air Force didn’t like most of the Pentagon’s new spending priorities, which seemed to favor the Army and the Navy. The B-47 bomber — long the mainstay of the Strategic Air Command and the favorite ride of Colonel Jimmy Stewart — was to be taken out of service. No additional B-52 bombers would be built. The fate of a supersonic replacement for the B-52 was suddenly uncertain, and plans for a nuclear-powered bomber were scrapped. McNamara had concluded that bombers were not only too costly to operate but increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defenses. The B-47 and the B-52 had been designed for high-altitude bombing; they would now have to attack at low altitudes to avoid Soviet radar. And the Soviets were beginning to put atomic warheads on their antiaircraft missiles, as well. During an attack on the Soviet Union, about half of SAC’s bomber crews, if not more, were expected to lose their lives.