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.It seemed that the "heartfelt agreement" between the government and public opinion on the Polish question would swallow up the movement—not at all! The movement grew more powerful, and became convinced of the government's weakness and its own strength, it saw the government con­fused at the moment of danger and bloodthirsty from fear in the presence of people shouting. It saw the Winter Palace dependent on the two English clubs and ceased to respect it, and it saw the sovereign talking nonsense, weeping, wishing to stop, carried along against his will—and ceased to fear him. The man, who in the first moment of danger, called forth declarations of devotion, must accept another kind of declarations, as Prince Shcherba- tov rightly noted in his speech.

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The incident in the Petersburg noble assembly carries the significance of a historical event—a revolutionary, oppositional event, with the full flavor of '89 along with several original touches, as one might expect, with Suvo­rov, for example, who (according to Le Nord) with deep regret relayed the veto by "the executive branch," rushing to such a degree that he answered before the question had been officially asked, probably as a result of inform­ing carried out by some sort of spy.²

Readers know the details better than we do; thanks to the modesty of the free Russian newspapers we haven't even read the four points proposed by Shcherbatov.³ We await further correspondence. [. . .]

However, we do not consider it out of place to express our opinion of the new phase of the revolutionary movement.

We are not on the side of the nobility as a social class.

We are not on the side of the government in its Petrine form.

The government and the nobility have their own accounts to settle. Why did the former at the beginning try to win them over, giving them land and people? Why did it first make them a terror squad and courtiers, and then begin to take back from the children what had been illegally given to the fathers?

Why was the gentry so thick-headed when the government handed over the people to rob and beat, and became impatiently, feverishly liberal when a portion of their gain began to be taken away?

We will not involve ourselves in their family quarrel.

However, if we are not on the side of the nobility and not on the side of the government, then we are absolutely on the side of the movement.

Everything that can undermine and wash away the barracks and the gov­ernment offices, everything that can carry into the general flow—and there dissolve—the bureaucracy and class monopolies, the military administra­tion of civic affairs, the clerks who rob the treasury, the treasury which robs the people—all this we will accept with joy and delight, no matter by whose hands it is accomplished. Smash things, gentlemen, and smash each other most of all. With this smashing your lives and ours will disappear. Later on our children will settle accounts. Revolutions in general do not hand down an inheritance intact, but half-achieved ideals and newly opened horizons.

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It's an odd thing—two fighters went at it, and victory depends on a third: with whomever he makes an alliance, that one will prevail, and this third fighter is the wordless people, the silent majority. It still remains silent and holds onto the land.

Only by bringing them into the movement, making their affair into a common affair, a popular affair for a landed assembly, rejecting monopo­lies, can the nobility have a serious talk with the government.

And the government can only undermine the oligarchic claims by con­fronting them with the popular majority, with the popular will, which in­sists and will insist on its right to land.

Notes

Source: "1789," Kolokol, l. 217, April 1, 1866; 19:46-48, 379-80.

The Etats Generaux were summoned May 5, 1789, on the eve of the French Revolu­tion, to resolve the financial crisis which had arisen during the reign of Louis XVI, and became the National Assembly. Herzen ironically compared this to the meeting of the Petersburg Noble Assembly from February 27 to March 4, 1866. At the March 1 ses­sion, Grigory A. Shcherbatov (1819-1881), the leader of the nobility, spoke in favor of expanding the rights of the zemstvos and of permitting the zemstvo assemblies the right of petition. Shcherbatov's proposal passed by an overwhelming majority. On March 3, however, several members in the minority resolved to submit their own opinion, but the assembly turned them down, and the majority view was sent to the government. Five days later, it was reported in The St. Petersburg Gazette that the proposal had been rejected as incompatible with the zemstvo law.

Count Suvorov was the military governor-general of St. Petersburg from 1861 to 1866.

Shcherbatov's speech was not published and was only briefly mentioned in the newspapers.

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